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Three marketing strategies (selling a put option, cash sale at harvest, and cash sale in June) are 
simulated  based  on  historical  values  and  ranked  based  on  certainty  equivalents  for  a 
representative irrigated and dryland cotton farm   Scenario analysis is also used to compare 
varying yield values.   
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Contemporary cotton producers have a number of marketing alternatives available to choose 
from in selling their product.  These marketing decisions can be involve a balancing act between 
risk  management  and  profit  maximization.  Some  marketing  alternatives  like  forward  pricing 
have  been  questioned  in  the  light  of  presumed  efficient  commodity  markets  (Zulauf  1998).  
However, both past and recent evaluations of cotton market efficiency, while indicating long-run 
efficiency, still highlight seasonal opportunities for hedging higher pre-harvest prices than at 
harvest  time  (Curtis  2007).  While  the  most  common  method  of  marketing  cotton  is  the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loan program, this program may be made more restrictive 
by the upcoming farm bill.   With the several marketing strategies available for the sale of cotton, 
the  question  under  study  is  which  alternative  will  be  preferred  by  a  presumably  risk  averse 
decision makers. 
 
This study tests several refutable hypotheses that 1) forward pricing (i.e., prior to harvest) in 
cotton gives significantly higher average net revenue than  2) selling at harvest in the local cash 
market, or 3) putting the crop into the CCC loan program for deferral of sale the following June.  
In addition, we evaluate the relative risk efficiency of these marketing alternatives for irrigated 
and dryland cotton farming.  As the problem is essentially an empirical question, the comparison 
of average net returns and ranking of net returns distributions based on certainty equivalents will 
be determined by the historical levels, variations, and seasonal patterns of pre-harvest and post-
harvest cotton prices.   A scenario analysis will be employed to evaluate each strategy, both 
irrigated and dryland, at a varying cotton farm yield levels of low, average, and high. 4 
 
Prior study has suggested that hedging strategies in the cotton market may show seasonality and 
a opportunity for capturing a profit.  As Zulauf and Irwin (1998) state, “For cotton, significant 
returns are found only when hedgers are net short for the entire month prior to the position being 
taken.” This may suggest that a risk factor could exist for cotton that makes limited seasonal 
hedging a relevant strategy.  Other researchers have studied specific times of year for the best 
time to forward contract for December cotton contracts. For example, Curtis et al. examined 
seasonal patterns of December cotton futures and Black-Scholes based estimates of put option 
prices to identify early March as the optimal time for preharvest hedging with put options.  Their 
results reflected a trade-off between longer time value and relatively low volatility of December 
options at that point in time 
 
The efficient market hypothesis underlies the argument for cash sale at harvest.  The efficiency 
of the market is demonstrated by a “random walk” of prices over a series of time.  An efficient 
market’s best forecaster of tomorrow’s price is the price today because all publicly available 
information is obtainable to participants in the market.  The theoretical argument for cash sale at 
harvest is that prices of storable commodities like cotton are difficult to predict.  Forward pricing 
is therefore seen as challenging at best, and perhaps futile.  Futures markets have been shown to 
have  varying  forecast  ability  depending  on  the  observed  efficiency  of  the  market.    Where 
markets are shown to be more efficient, a forecast model’s ability is reduced and does not show 
much consistent accuracy at predicting future’s price (Zulauf 1998).  In applying a cash sale at 
harvest strategy, the farmer is content with absorbing the risk associated with taking a price 
during the harvest season.  5 
 
The objective of the study was to identify risk efficient marketing strategies for a representative 
west Texas cotton farm.  To accomplish this, the analysis ranked the net revenue distribution of 
alternative  marketing  strategies  to  discover  which  was  dominant  based  upon  certainty 
equivalents.    A  Monte-Carlo  simulation  model  was  used  to  make  the  comparison  among  1) 
forward pricing with put options, 2) selling the crop at harvest using spot price cash sale, 3) cash 
sale the following June.     
 
Data/Procedures 
Evaluating specific preharvest strategies, with specific target prices, begs a larger question of 
whether hedging is even relevant.  That is, does the futures and options market affords frequent 
enough opportunity for a grower to hedge his/her cost of production?  To examine this, we 
simulated a moving average forecast for the following year’s yield was made based off historical 
price data for daily future and option prices over the last twenty years.  The fixed and variable 
costs associated with the farm are discovered by dividing the predicted yield by the cost data 
retrieved from the Texas Cooperative Extension Service.   
 
Historical data of cotton futures settlement prices, historical daily put option premiums, historical 
local prices from county data from one specific county in west Texas, and historical adjusted 
world price (AWP) were used in the simulation model.  Each marketing strategy uses these price 
data sets as the basis for the forecasted prices used in the model.   The county yield data were 
taken from multiple farms within multiple counties from Crop Insurance records.  Individual 
farms were taken from the counties surrounding and including Hale County.  Six individual 6 
farms are chosen based on yield values.  The data were separated into dryland and irrigated 
farms to essentially have two models to represent the varied risk associate with the different 
farming practices.  Three irrigated farms and three dryland farms were picked out of the yield 
data sets based on their ten year historic coefficient of variation, (CV).  The CV is the standard 
deviation of the historic data divided by the mean of the historic data, where it is all multiplied 
by 100 to derive a percentage.  This statistic explains the variance within the historic values and 
allows a comparison to be drawn between farms.  After ranking all of the farm yield data by CV, 
the median CV farm was selected to represent a middle representative yield.  The lower yield 
farm was selected as the one having standard deviation above the median CV farm and the 
higher yield farm was picked by one standard deviation below the median CV farm.  A CV 
greater  in  value  (CV>1)  indicates  higher  variance  in  yield  values,  while  a  lower  (CV<1) 
demonstrates a lower variance in  yield values,  i.e. more consistency in  yield production.   It 
happened that the high CV matched with the lower average yields, the low CV matched with the 
higher average yields, and the median CV matched with a yield between the lower and higher 
average yield values for dryland and irrigated.    
 
The yield data of the six farms (i.e., high/medium/low yield, by irrigated or dryland) is assigned 
a  unavariate  empirical  probability  distribution.    The  error  term  for  each  yield  is  given  a 
probability that directly follows the probabilities found throughout the historical data set.  This 
non-normal distribution exactly follows the probabilities found in history, so no value above or 
below history can be produced based of the mean of history.  The empirical distribution essential 
becomes the error term associated with making the yields stochastic. 
 7 
Price  data  were  made  available  through  the  former  New  York  Board  of  Trade  (now 
Intercontinental Exchange, or ICE) for futures price for the first trading day in December and 
June for a December and June contract.  Spot price data for the first trading day in December and 
June for Lubbock, TX as well as adjusted world price historical data for first trading day in 
December and June were obtained from USDA-AMS data compiled at Texas A&M University 
(Gleaton 2007).  The difference between December’s spot price and December’s futures price 
and the difference between June’s spot price and June’s futures price was used to discover basis 
for that historical year. All price data for December used prices from 1996 to 2006 while all price 
data for June used data from 1997 to 2007.  The difference in years used is because December 
was lagged a year because the following June price is more correlated with the previous year’s 
December’s price for that marketing year.  National price provided by the Agricultural Policy 
Center from 1996 to 2006 as well as the 2007 FAPRI forecasted price for the August 2007 to 
July  2008  marketing  year.    The  national  price  is  the  average  price  of  cash  marketed  cotton 
around the United States. 
 
The price data set was constructed by the collected history and tested for trend as an aid in 
stabilizing simulation forecasts.   Ordinary least  squares  (OLS) was applied to determine the 
presence of time trend in historical data (Hughes 1980).  No significant trend was found in either 
the price data or the basis for December and June.  The yield data were also found not to have 
any significant trend. 
 
A multivariate empirical probability distribution was placed on the variables to account for their 
correlation.   Since no trend was found historically in the data, the distribution used percent 8 
deviate from mean for the distributions. This type of probability distribution correlates inter-
temporal prices by means of a correlation matrix through a non-normal distribution.  Correlated 
uniform standard deviates (CUSD) were formed through the matrix.  The error term for each 
variable  was  generated  when  the  CUSD’s  are  combined  with  the  empirical  probability 
distribution associated with each variable making these variables stochastic. (Richardson 2000).   
 
The stochastic forecast of national price equaled the FAPRI predicted 2007 price multiplied by 
one plus the national price distribution (the one accounts for the probability distribution being 
described  as  a  percentage).  Using  the  national  price  as  a  function  in  determining  spot  and 
adjusted world prices, the historic national price data set was regressed against every other price 
variable, except June and December basis price variables. (Bailey 1985)  The regression became 
the  formula  for  which  a  deterministic  forecast  was  derived  for  each  other  variable.    The 
stochastic forecast for basis used the mean of historical basis multiplied by one plus the basis’ 
probability distribution.   
 
The variables were simulated through software which uses a form of Latin Hyper Cube number 
generation  based  on  the  distribution  set  around  the  data  point.    Latin  Hyper  Cube  evenly 
distributes the simulated random numbers based of probabilities assigned by the distribution 
(Richardson 2007). Each strategy was ranked based in terms of certainty equivalents (CE) as the 
measurement of risk aversion over a defined range. This approach, stochastic efficiency with 
respect to a function (SERF), reveals the strategy that is most preferred for the representative 
farm over the historical data. The CE is a measurement of the risk premium associated with a 
utility curve where a critical point is defined as the decision maker being indifferent between the 9 
value and the risky outcome (Hardaker 2004).  A breakeven risk aversion coefficient (BRAC) 
means  that  a  decision  maker  prefers  one  strategy  over  another.    As  the  BRAC  changes  in 
number,  preference  over  strategies  will  change  (McCarl  1988).    The  BRAC  used  ranking 
marketing strategies uses the formula 4 divided by net worth.  Net worth was determined by 
using a representative farm from the Texas High Plains assets sheet provided by the Agricultural 
Policy Center. Assuming that liabilities are 75% of assets, 25% of assets became net worth.  At 
this BRAC, the marketing strategy with the largest CE line determined the preferred strategy. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The  analysis  of  available  market  opportunities  found  that  pre-harvest  (January-June)  futures 
price  for  December  contracts  covered  production  costs  nearly  90%  of  the  time  for  a 
representative dryland and irrigated farm.  Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the probabilities of a 
Futures Price less local basis (six cents) less option premium (three cents) being greater than the 
variable cost and total cost of production for each management style of farming assuming a 
strike  price  of  65  cents  at  a  premium  of  3  cents  can  be  made  acceptable  when  looking  at 
historical strike price for the last twenty years.  Eleven out of the twenty-one years analyzed 
(1987-2007 Jan-June) found an ‘out of the money’ put option strike price at 65 cents.  Premiums 
over this time averaged just over one cent per put option.  The assumption to make the premium 
three cents derives for the years where the strike price may be closer to the ‘money.’  
 
The put option strategy involves an assumed set strike price and set premium.  Since the model is 
designed  for  extension  work,  these  fixed  inputs  can  be  changed  as  the  real  time  market 
environment changes.  Assuming a farmer can find a put option December contract strike price 10 
of  65  cents  within  the  first  half  of  the  year  (January-  June)  with  an  associated  three  cents 
premium, the option was executed depending on variance of futures price i.e. upward variance 
will force the model to sell on cash market minus the base (made stochastic by the difference 
between the stochastic futures and stochastic spot price) and the set premium.  The 65 cents 
strike price was used as a common strike price for this type of hedge.   
 
The  forward  pricing  strategy  involves  buying  a  put  for  a  December  contract  in  the  first  six 
months of the year of harvest assuming a 65 cents strike price along with a three cents premium 
is obtainable some time during the six month window.  If there is no intrinsic value (intrinsic 
value for put equals strike minus futures price) then the premium was lost multiplied by the 
amount hedged.  If there was intrinsic value, then the premium for selling the put equals the 
amount of intrinsic value (time value is assumed to be non-existent because put is sold near 
expiration of December contract).  The amount to be hedged was determined by the expected 
value of that years harvest based off the history of farm.  The actual crop was then sold on the 
spot market in the month of December. 
 
The cash sale at harvest involved selling the crop on the spot market at time of harvest.   The 
cash sale in June required keeping the crop in storage until June when the loan program for that 
marketing year expired.  Each of these strategies took the spot price for the corresponding month 
and multiplies that by the yield harvested. 
 
Government support was included in each marketing strategy.  The government support was 
provided in the form of direct payments and counter cyclical for producers.  A direct payment 11 
works by taking 85 percent of “base acres” (obtained from history) of a farm and multiplies these 
acres by the “direct payment rate” per unit and the “direct payment yield” obtained from USDA 
Farm Service Agency.  These payments are considered to be de-coupled from price.  Counter-
cyclical payments work by congress making a target price into law.  This target price is the 
stationary ceiling at which is compared to the seasonal average price for cotton.  If the price for 
cotton  falls  below  this  ceiling,  a  payment  is  made  equaling  the  target  price  less  the  season 
average price.  If the season average price rises above the target price, then no payment is made. 
(Monke 2004).   
 
The three marketing strategies applied to both an irrigated and dryland representative west Texas 
cotton farms found consistency in the ranking of strategies as well as a clear dominate strategy 
from statistical data resourced from the simulation.  In every scenario (high, medium, and low 
yield) found the preferred strategy to be the use of the put option, followed by cash sale at 
harvest, and then cash sale in June.   
 
The  representative  irrigated  farm  saw  a  positive  certainty  equivalent  value  (CE)  for  the  put 
option strategy in each yield scenario.  While the cash sale at harvest and cash sale in June 
strategies only found a positive CE for the highest yield scenario.  The difference between a 
positive and negative CE is that for a positive CE, the farmer is better farming rather than not 
farming.  A negative CE indicates that the farmer is better off not farming at all if the strategy 
with the negative CE value is applied.  In Figures 3, 4, and 5 shows the SERF analysis that ranks 
the  marketing  strategies  for  each  yield  scenario  based  off  the  strategy’s  CE  value.    In  each 
irrigated yield scenario, the put option strategy had the highest CE value followed by cash sale at 12 
harvest and then by cash sale in June.   Figure 5 shows positive CE’s for each strategy which 
indicated under this yield scenario the farmer would benefit using any of the three strategies 
rather than not farming.  However, the farmer is better off using the put option strategy rather 
than the cash sale at harvest or the least preferred strategy of cash sale in June. 
 
The representative dryland farm saw a negative CE value for each strategy through each yield 
scenario.  As dryland is an inherently a more risky production strategy, historical values used to 
generate the stochastic forecast for 2007 saw lower yields and the possibility of years of no 
production for each  yield scenario.  Though the put option strategy was the most preferred, 
followed by cash sale at harvest, and then by cash sale in June, the SERF analysis revealed each 
strategy as having had produced a negative CE value for each yield scenario.  The negative CE 
value indicated that the farmer is better off not farming at all rather than using any of these 
strategies analyzed in Figures 6, 7, and 8.  The negative CE values are a direct result of the low 
yields generated from the historical representative yield scenario farms and the higher yield risk 
associated with dryland farming.   
 
Conclusions 
The movement to reduce U.S. government support of the agricultural sector has been gaining 
momentum.  Now the commodity producer may have to look beyond federal farm programs for 
reducing the risk associated with prices and farm income.  While the future of the present CCC 
loan  program  is  unknown,  other  marketing  strategies  are  available.    This  research  is 
comprehensive in that it integrates policy and marketing approaches in price risk management.  
The research is also timely given the timetable of the farm bill process.  This study quantifies the 13 
risk/reward  trade-off  of  these  strategies  while  providing  a  ranking.    One  limitation  of  this 
approach  is  the  assumption  that  future  risk  is  reflected  by  historical  distributions  of  price 
variables. 
 
Even if prices are forecasted to be extremely high during harvest, buying a put option earlier in 
the year at one’s cost of production (if below futures price) provides an out of the money option  
that translates into cheap insurance if the bottom falls out on price.  The producer will only lose 
the low out of the money premium.  Various hedging strategies can be applied to reduce price 
risk while this analysis only included one, though one demonstrates the potential of the use of 
derivatives.  Years where prices are too low to find a low premium to justify a hedging strategy 
has  occurred  historically.    The  analysis  suggests  that  years  were  a  producer  can  see  an 
opportunity early in the year to find an affordable premium, the opportunity for the farmer to 
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Figure 1: Dryland Farm: Probability Strike Price is above Production Costs 



























Figure 2: Irrigated Farm: Probability Strike Price is above Production Costs 


































Figure 3: Irrigated Low Yield Farm: SERF Analysis based on Certainty Equivalents  
Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to A Function (SERF) 
Under a Neg. Exponential Utility Function
Naïve Hedge 
Strategy: 1
Cash Sale at 
Harvest: 1












0 0.000005 0.00001 0.000015 0.00002 0.000025
ARAC




Figure 4: Irrigated Medium Yield Farm: SERF Analysis based on Certainty Equivalents 
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Figure 5: Irrigated High Yield Farm: SERF Analysis based on Certainty Equivalents 
Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to A Function (SERF) 
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Figure 6: Dryland Low Yield Farm: SERF Analysis based on Certainty Equivalents 
Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to A Function (SERF) 
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Figure 7: Dryland Medium Yield Farm: SERF Analysis based on Certainty Equivalents 18 
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Figure 8: Dryland High Yield Farm: SERF Analysis based on Certainty Equivalents 
Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to A Function (SERF) 
Under a Neg. Exponential Utility Function
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